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Abstract 
Many studies document that women with children tend to earn lower wages than women 
without children (a shortfall known as the ‘child penalty’ or ‘family gap’). Despite the 
existence of several hypotheses about the causes of the child penalty, much about the gap in 
wages remains unexplained. This study explores the premise that mothers might substitute 
income for advantageous, non-pecuniary job characteristics. More specifically, the hypothesis 
to be investigated is that if the labour market rewards working arrangements that involve 
disamenities, to some extent the child penalty might be a compensating wage differential for 
the disamenities avoided by mothers. 
In order to assess the impact of motherhood on the choice between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job features in Germany, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is 
used. The longitudinal nature of the data allows a comparison of working women before and 
after the birth of their first child. Furthermore, the GSOEP provides detailed information on 
personal attributes, job characteristics and job satisfaction, which enables the application of the 
following three steps to test the hypothesis. First, an event study is used to analyse the changes 
in the characteristics of a woman’s job around the birth of her first child. The features of 
interest are time, workload and flexibility. Second, job characteristics are included by their 
utility (proxied by job satisfaction) for a mother. Third, following the approach of hedonic 
wage regressions, these (dis)amenities are included in the wage regression in order to see 
whether a trade-off exists between pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics. The results 
suggest that to some degree the child penalty can be interpreted as a compensating wage 
differential. 
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The Child Penalty 
A Compensating Wage Differential? 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 22/August 2006 
Christina Felfe 
1. Introduction 
The fact that working mothers tend to earn less than women without children seems to be well 
established in the economic literature and is called the ‘child penalty’ or ‘family gap’. Several 
researchers have found raw wage gaps of almost 20% in the US, 13% in the UK and up to 20% 
in Germany.
1 They have investigated the following hypotheses about its causes: loss in human 
capital owing to maternity leave, choice of sector or job type, different working schedules, 
limited flexibility, employer discrimination, heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers, 
etc. Yet so far, not many have explored the hypothesis that the jobs of women with and those 
without children may differ with respect to certain non-pecuniary characteristics. In other 
words, mothers might make their decision to participate in the labour market and choose their 
job according to different criteria than non-mothers. If a better paid job does not offer family-
friendly conditions, a mother may decide to stay out of the labour market or to work at a lower 
paid job with better features. Thus a mother might substitute income for convenient job 
characteristics, referred to as ‘amenities’. The hypothesis to be tested is that if the labour market 
rewards working arrangements that involve disamenities, to some extent the child penalty might 
be a compensating wage differential for the disamenities avoided by mothers. 
In order to investigate the impact of motherhood on the choice between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job characteristics in Germany, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) is used (1984-2003). The dataset provides detailed information about personal 
attributes and job characteristics, with attention given to the pecuniary and particularly the non-
pecuniary aspects of jobs. In addition, it provides data on job satisfaction, which is used as a 
proxy for utility and enables testing based on the theory of hedonic wages that pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary job characteristics jointly determine the satisfaction of a mother. The longitudinal 
nature of the data allows the observation of women during their fertile ages (defined as age 16 
to 46). As a result, not only can we compare the jobs of mothers and non-mothers, but also the 
jobs of mothers before and after they have had their first child. Using the information provided 
by the GSOEP, it is possible to test the hypothesis of the child penalty as a compensating wage 
differential using the three steps outlined below.  
First of all it is necessary to investigate whether jobs change not only with respect to financial 
aspects but also non-financial ones around the birth of the first child. The methodology used is 
an event study analysis, which examines the effects of the first birth on a variety of job 
characteristics. The second step shows whether, and if so how, these job features become utility 
factors for mothers. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, the utility a 
worker gains from his/her job is jointly determined by its pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
characteristics. In the case where a working mother is willing to give up some of her income in 
order to have a more family-friendly job, a gain in certain job characteristics has to compensate 
for this loss in wages and thus raise the utility of the job for the mother. Therefore job 
satisfaction is regressed (using satisfaction as a proxy for utility) on certain job features. In a last 
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step an attempt is made to measure how much of their wages mothers are willing to give up in 
exchange for a job with more amenities (and fewer disamenities). A hedonic wage regression is 
run that includes certain (dis)amenities as control variables. The results of these regressions give 
evidence that some disamenities raise wages significantly. Furthermore, it can be seen that 
including (dis)amenities decreases the child penalty, which gives evidence that at least some of 
the family gap can be explained by a substitution of income with family-friendly job 
characteristics.  
The contribution of this study is to investigate whether mothers substitute income for 
advantageous, non-pecuniary job characteristics and thus if the child penalty might be a 
compensating wage differential. The determination of important job features for mothers, which 
could facilitate a better balance of career and family, and their price in the labour market, may 
be useful for a better design of family policy.  
The study is structured in the following way. In section 2 previous research about the child 
penalty is briefly presented. Then in section 3 the theory of compensating wage differentials is 
introduced in order to explain why mothers have to choose between jobs offering different 
packages of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Section 4 describes the data and the 
methodology used to test for compensating wage differentials. Section 5 reports the regression 
results in detail. Section 6 concludes, with suggested avenues for further research. 
2. Literature  review 
The negative impact of motherhood on individual wages seems to be a well-established 
empirical fact. The most common approach to analysing the wage effect of having children has 
been to estimate the child penalty, i.e. by comparing the wages of women with and without 
children while controlling for observed characteristics. The family gap in the US and UK, 
according to Waldfogel (1994), is large and persistent. Among young women, mothers’ wages 
lag 20 percentage points behind those of non-mothers. Harkness & Waldfogel (1999) find some 
evidence of the family gap in several industrialised countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Finland and Sweden. But different institutions in these countries lead to wide 
variation in the magnitudes of the gap (the UK displayed the largest child penalty). On the one 
hand, a larger family gap is positively correlated with the gender gap, while on the other hand it 
is negatively correlated with women’s labour market participation. 
Several theoretical explanations for the child penalty are offered in the socio-economic 
literature. The first hypothesis is that maternity leave interrupts the labour market career and 
leads, like all kinds of career interruptions, to a loss in work experience and thus in a 
depreciation of human capital (Mincer & Polachek, 1974). For the US and the UK, Waldfogel 
(1998b) shows that maternity leave leads to the depreciation of human capital and in turn 
reduces wages, even if maternity leave allows mothers to maintain the relationship with their 
previous employer. In Germany career interruptions lead to a reduction in wage rates for both 
men and women (Beblo & Wolf, 2002). Despite the relatively generous German parental leave 
system, Kunze (2002) found a higher depreciation of human capital as a result of maternity 
leave than unemployment. 
Alongside career interruptions, a second explanation holds that periods of part-time work cause 
depreciation in human capital. Traditional wage estimations that do not control for depreciation 
underestimate the return to work experience. A new approach substitutes actual experience by 
effective experience, taking into account the duration of non-working and part-time spells of 
employment. For the US and the UK, Waldfogel (1997) shows that periods of part-time work 
are relevant for explaining the child penalty. In Joshi, Paci & Waldfogel (1999), the child 
penalty is examined for two cohorts of British women. By using the Oaxaca decomposition they 
find that part-time employment can explain some of the family gap. Nevertheless, there is still THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 3 
 
evidence of the family gap for women who are in full-time employment. Beblo & Wolf (2000) 
include in their estimations about German mothers not only part-time periods of work but also 
the timing of career interruptions. Their estimation results suggest that deviations from full-time 
employment are penalised by significant wage cuts. Additionally, the wage rate falls even more 
if the period of discontinuity of the career is postponed. 
A third explanation refers to the unobserved heterogeneity among women. The underlying idea 
is that women differ with respect to abilities and preferences, which are usually unobserved and 
may be correlated with fertility. To deal with this aspect most of the studies apply a fixed-effect 
methodology, which removes unobserved permanent characteristics. Using this methodology 
Waldfogel (1997) rejects the hypothesis of unobserved pay-relevant heterogeneity of mothers 
and non-mothers. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), however, Lundberg & 
Rose (2000) find a family gap of 9% even before the first birth. Kunze & Ejrnaes (2004) 
confirm the dip in wages before the first birth for Germany. This ‘unexplained’ dip in wages 
prior to children might indicate heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers, and could be 
another explanation of the child penalty: fertility could be endogenous to the wage process, i.e. 
successful women might postpone having children or choose not to. 
Previous studies have also documented a fourth hypothesis, in which the differences in income 
between women with and without children are related to sectoral or occupational segregation. 
Sectors or types of jobs held by mothers are, in general, lower paid. This loss in income might 
be compensated by a more family-friendly working environment, which explains the child 
penalty to some degree. Nielsen, Simonsen & Verner (2001) addressed the issue of the choice of 
sector. Using a model where the choice of the private versus the public sector is endogenous, 
they find only a small wage effect of career interruptions in the public sector and no effects in 
the private sector. Beblo, Bender & Wolf (2004) have recently developed an interesting 
approach to differences among sectors and firms by matching mothers and non-mothers with 
similar characteristics within firms. They also confirm a significant child penalty. 
The job choice of mothers, however, is limited according to the hypothesis of their lower job 
mobility. The fact that mothers may be less mobile or flexible constitutes the fifth hypothesis to 
explain the child penalty. Owing to higher job-search costs, mothers maintain poor job matches; 
the quality of their job match improves only slowly and lower earnings follow as a 
consequence. Conversely, Waldfogel (1998a) and Phipps, Burton & Lethbridge (2001) find that 
maintaining the same job position after maternity leave actually decreases the child penalty. 
Staying with the same employer acts as a kind of insurance against income loss. 
The hypothesis of discrimination is the last one often referred to, but it is hard to prove. 
Discrimination means that given the same individual attributes, employers treat mothers and 
non-mothers differently for reasons not related to productivity. Employer prejudices could 
include the idea that, for example, mothers are less productive since they have less time and 
effort to invest in their job. Becker (1985) and Hersch & Stratton (1997) have already suggested 
this hypothesis. Phipps, Burton & Lethbridge (2001) include the numbers of hours spent on 
unpaid work in their estimation. This approach to testing the discrimination theory reveals that 
the loss in income declines, but the child penalty remains significant. 
Although these earlier studies have tried to include several possible factors underlying the child 
penalty, so far the possibility that mothers might work in jobs with different characteristics has 
not been addressed. This study adds to the literature by attempting to determine whether 
mothers substitute income with pleasant job conditions (amenities) in order to better combine 
family and career. The goal of this analysis is to find out which job amenities attract mothers 
and if (to some extent) the child penalty may be a compensating wage differential. Using a 
longitudinal dataset (the GSOEP), the prevalence of several non-wage job characteristics is 
estimated for German mothers during their fertile ages, revealing that some changes take place 4 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
around the first birth. Regressing satisfaction for several non-wage job features demonstrates 
that family-friendly conditions raise the job satisfaction of mothers. This gives rise to the 
hypothesis that mothers might be willing to substitute income with those amenities. Including 
these (dis)amenities in the wage regression provides evidence for a trade-off between pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary job characteristics and thus for the hypothesis that to some extent the child 
penalty may be a compensating wage differential. 
Before testing the hypothesis empirically, the theory of compensating wage differentials is 
briefly introduced in order to make a plausible case as to why a mother may have to give up 
some of her income for a job offering more amenities. 
3.  The theory of compensating wage differentials 
Economic theory assumes that workers try to maximise their utility. A higher monetary 
compensation increases the utility of a worker, but it is clear that money is not all that matters. 
The utility an individual derives from a particular job depends upon an individual’s 
characteristics, the wage s/he can receive on the job, and other non-pecuniary characteristics of 
the job. The utility of a worker can be defined as the following function:
2 
    Uijt ( wijt, djt, ait) = wijt (djt) – djt *ait                  (1) 
      where wijt = wage of individual i in job j at time t 
           djt = disamenities of job j at time t 
           ait = aversion of individual i against disamenities at time t 
    Uijt’(wijt) >0; Uijt’(djt) < 0; wijt‘(djt)> 0 and wjt‘’(djt)< 0 
Under complete information and perfect mobility, a worker is able to ‘visit’ different markets 
and choose the job that gives him/her the greatest satisfaction. In other words, the problem of 
each worker consists of selecting the best combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary job 
characteristics in order to maximise the worker’s utility. The maximisation problem, taking into 
consideration the participation constraint (i.e. participating in the labour market has a higher 
utility than not participating) can be presented as: 
    max    Uijt ( wijt, djt, ait) = wijt (djt) – djt *ait                (2) 
      s.t. Uijt ( wijt, djt, ait) >= Uijt ( 0, 0, ait)         
   F O C :   δwijt/ δdjt  =  ait        
The solution to this problem indicates that a worker chooses the job in which the marginal 
return to disamenities δwijt/δdjt is equal to the aversion ait that it gives rise to. Since the 
marginal return to disamenities is decreasing with an increasing amount of disamenities, the 
amount of disamenities djt a worker can stand diminishes with ait measuring the disutility of 
disamenities. Figure 1 represents the choice of two workers differing in their aversion against 
amenities (a
1> a
2, i.e. worker 1 has a stronger aversion against disamenities a
1 than worker 2 
with a
2). 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious a priori how different job characteristics enter the utility 
function, i.e. if they are amenities or disamenities, and what are the packages of different 
characteristics that give rise to the same level of utility.  
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Figure 1. The theory of equalising difference 
 
Source: Rosen (1986). 
 
The following section describes the data and explains the methodology used in order to test how 
different job characteristics determine the utility of mothers, and whether the child penalty may 
be a compensating wage differential. 
4.  Data and methodology  
The dataset used is the GSOEP, which is an annually repeated survey of Germans and 
foreigners in West and East Germany (1984-2003). Since 1984 the GSOEP has followed the 
members of the panel. In 2003 the GSOEP provided information about more than 12,000 
households consisting of more than 24,000 persons.  
The longitudinal nature of the data allows the observation of mothers for the years around the 
birth of their first child. Thus, not only can we compare the jobs of mothers and non-mothers, 
but also the jobs of women before and after they became a mother. The GSOEP has two other 
features that make the survey especially suitable to a methodology for testing the hypothesis of 
the child penalty as a compensating wage differential. First, the GSOEP has detailed annual 
information on personal attributes and pecuniary job characteristics and for some years several 
non-pecuniary ones as well. This information is necessary to set up a relation between the 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary features of a job. Second, the GSOEP provides data about job 
satisfaction, which is used as a proxy for utility and thus allows the testing of whether certain 
job characteristics enter the utility function.  
The sample of interest includes all women in their fertile period, defined as age 16 to 46. It 
consists of 2,824 individuals, 1,895 of whom are mothers (defined as all women who have had a 
baby prior to 2003)
3 and 929 of whom are non-mothers as of 2003. This definition, however, 
does not exclude the possibility that a woman without children might become a mother after 
                                                 
3 An alternative dataset includes only those women who gave birth to their first child between 1985 and 
2002. Taking attrition into account as well, this dataset guarantees that women are observed (at least one 
period) before and after the event of the first birth. The decision to use the dataset including all women 
who first gave birth before 2003 was for the following reasons: first, the possibility that the timing of the 
first child might be endogenous could not be excluded; second, the larger sample size of the first dataset 
leads to more significant results. In any case, the results using the dataset including mothers whose first 
birth was between 1985 and 2002 are available on request. 6 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
2003. The interest lies in job characteristics and thus only working women are considered in the 
analysis. That being said, women are likely to drop out of the labour market when becoming a 
mother. This trend could lead to a sample selection bias, which is addressed in section 4.1.2. 
Furthermore, missing observations for non-pecuniary job characteristics reduce the sample a 
great deal. Still, using information about job changes, some information can be reconstructed 
(see section 5.2.2). 
In order to test the hypothesis of the child penalty as a compensating wage differential, the 
following methodology, divided into three parts, is applied.  
A first step is to investigate whether motherhood really affects non-wage job characteristics, i.e. 
if not only wage but also non-wage job aspects change after motherhood and consequently the 
loss of wages may be compensated by an increase in amenities. In order to estimate changes in 
job characteristics around and after motherhood, an event study analysis is used, which 
examines the effects of the first birth on a variety of job characteristics. This method is 
described in section 4.1.1. A second necessary step is to show if and how certain job features 
enter the utility function of mothers. According to the theory of compensating wage 
differentials, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary features jointly determine the utility of a 
worker. In the case where a mother is willing to give up some of her income in order to have a 
more family-friendly job, a gain in certain job characteristics has to compensate for this loss in 
wages and raise the job’s utility for the mother. In order to test this empirically, a satisfaction 
regression is used, which is explained in section 4.2. In a last step an attempt is made to measure 
the compensating wage differential, i.e. how much of their wages mothers are willing to give up 
for having a job with more amenities (fewer disamenities). Therefore at this stage a hedonic 
wage regression is run that includes certain (dis)amenities as control variables. This regression 
is explained in section 4.3. 
4.1  Empirical test of changes in job characteristics around the first  
birth 
4.1.1 Event study 
As noted above, the first step involved in testing whether the child penalty is a compensating 
wage differential is to show that the jobs of women before and after the first birth differ not only 
in wages but also in other non-wage aspects. This comparison is done in the form of an event 
study analysis, a method used to see if a particular event influences some outcome – here if 
motherhood influences job characteristics. The basic model is the following: 
      Yit = β1*Pre1it+β2*Birth11it+β3*Post1it +δ*Xit + ai + uit             (3) 
Since the goal is to determine the impact of motherhood on job characteristics, the dependent 
variable Yit represents all pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics, described below.  
In order to compare the job characteristics around the first birth, the following three dummies 
have been introduced: Birth1it represents the year of the first birth; Pre1it represents all years 
prior; and Post1it represents all years after the first birth.
4 An example illustrates the definition 
of the three dummies as follows: if a mother gives birth to her first child in 1990 for example, 
the year 1990 will be defined as the year of birth.
5 According to the definition given above, all 
                                                 
4 For a non-mother all three dummies (Birth, Pre and Post) take the value of 0.  
5 In order to distinguish between births, which are early and late in the year, year t is defined as the birth 
year if the child is born before September of year t, and respectively year t+1 as the birth year if the birth 
takes place between September and December of year t. THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 7 
 
years from 1984 to 1989 are summarised in the Pre1 period and all the following years of 1991 
to 2003 are summarised in the Post1 period. The dummy Pre1 is introduced in order to capture 
the heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers that may already exist before the first birth. 
The child penalty can be measured as β3-β1, i.e. it compares how the job of a woman changes 
after the first birth in comparison to before. 
The event study (represented by equation (3)) documents changes in job characteristics for 
mothers around the time of their first birth. First, the effect of motherhood on wages is 
estimated to have a measure of the family gap. Second, the effect on several non-pecuniary job 
characteristics is estimated. An overview of all job characteristics, their definition and how they 
are constructed can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.
6 
For the estimation of the wage gap the logarithm of the gross and net wage rate is calculated 
taking into account contracted working hours.
7 The advantage of taking agreed hours instead of 
actual working hours is that they are an objective measure and do not have many outliers. The 
selection of job amenities, for which a mother may be willing to substitute income, follows the 
literature on compensating wage differentials for disamenities as shown in Rosen (1986), Usui 
(2003) and Villanueva (2004). They distinguish among different disamenities such as the 
regulation of working hours, workload and job security. Thus the aspects of time, workload and 
flexibility are considered here.  
Time is a scarce resource for a mother since she has to allocate it to both job and family. 
Therefore it can be assumed that the marginal utility of time increases when a woman becomes 
a mother. This may lead to a reallocation of the hours spent on the job and on housework. 
Weekly working hours are considered first, in fact controlling for the amount of hours a woman 
is actually working, i.e. the contracted working hours plus overtime. Furthermore, different 
aspects of the schedule are taken into consideration such as work in the evening or at night and 
shift work. Also investigated is whether the job of a woman allows for a certain degree of 
flexibility. Different aspects of flexibility are important for a mother since this allows her to 
better combine career and family. One aspect is a flexible working schedule, i.e. if a woman can 
set her working hours as she likes. Another feature determining the flexibility of a job is the 
possibility to work from home. For the job decision the fixed costs of travelling to work play a 
role as well; thus, the distance to the job, measured in kilometres, is evaluated. Jobs additionally 
differ in the level of workload measured by stress and physical demand. Workload may be 
relevant for a mother since she has to face a double load of work on the job and at home. It is 
clear that these variables are highly subjective and may be evaluated differently by everyone – 
including by mothers and non-mothers. Lastly, a job might offer some undesirable working 
conditions such as heat and gases, which a woman may wish to avoid when becoming a mother. 
Each of the above-described job characteristics is regressed (separately) on the dummies Pre, 
Birth and Post as well as on a set of control variables, including personal attributes such as 
marital status, age, age squared, education and origin, represented by the variable Xit. Marital 
status is described by a dummy called ‘partner’, which is 1 for all women who are either 
married or who have a permanent partner; otherwise it is 0. Both age and age squared are 
included in order to capture the decreasing positive returns to experience. Education is measured 
in years. A woman may be West or East German, or a foreigner. Finally, a set of dummies for 
the years from 1984 to 2003 is included. 
                                                 
6 For reasons of simplicity several variables have been made binary. For the construction, see Table A1 in 
the appendix. 
7 Hourly wages are calculated by dividing monthly income by the contracted working hours per month. 
Since only weekly working hours are available, these are adjusted to a monthly measure by multiplying 
everything by 31/7 (days per month/days per week). 8 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
Taking the basic event analysis model and the specification of variables described above allows 
the impact of motherhood on certain job characteristics to be measured. Linear fixed-effect 
models are applied in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, such as preferences for job 
characteristics and family life.  
It is important for this analysis to have in mind that women, especially mothers, often do not 
continuously participate in the labour market. This leads to the fact that women, particularly 
after motherhood, drop out of the sample, which may give rise to sample selection and biased 
estimates. Therefore a test of sample selection bias is applied, and where necessary the 
correction suggested by Wooldridge (1995), both of which are explained in the next section. 
4.1.2 Sample selection and labour force participation 
As empirical evidence and past research confirm, there is still a strong negative impact of 
motherhood on labour force participation. We can observe this impact from looking at our 
sample, which includes all women aged between 16 and 46, who are observed to be employed 
at least at some point between 1984 and 2003 and who have either had a baby before 2003 or 
not had a baby as of 2003. An overview of labour force participation around the first birth can 
be found in Table A2 in the appendix. 
A high percentage of women drop out of the labour force when having a child. Although before 
the first birth participation in the labour market rises continuously (79.4% of women worked 
five years before the first child, 84.4% two years before and 83.35% one year before), it falls 
dramatically in the year of the first birth (35.60%) and even more so the year after (26.43%). 
Some of mothers decide to return to work, but this return is only observed gradually: after two 
years 37% of the mothers are employed; after three years more than 40% are employed and after 
six years it rises to more than 50%. Yet even if some mothers return to the labour market, others 
may never return after having children – even after the first child is an adult less than 65% of 
the mothers work, while prior to the first child more than 80% work. 
As previously mentioned, the fact that women drop out of the labour force (especially when 
becoming a mother) constitutes a self-selection of mothers and thus possibly leads to a sample 
selection problem. It is well known that failure to account for sample selection can lead to 
inconsistent estimates. Linear panel data models, which take care of unobserved, individual 
permanent heterogeneity, cannot eliminate the sample selection bias by simply applying a fixed-
effect model. This is because the sample-selection effect, which is determined by the selection 
equation and is entered additively to the main equation, is generally an unknown nonlinear 
function of both the observed time-varying regressors and the unobservable individual effects of 
the selection equation, and is therefore not constant over time. 
The problem of sample selection in panel data has been a topic of recent econometric 
investigation. One of the first approaches to assessing for endogeneity and sample selection was 
suggested by Wooldridge (1995). He proposed a test and correction procedure that allows for 
correlation between the unobserved effects of both the selection and primary equations. His 
model specifies a distributional assumption only for the error terms in the selection equation, 
but not for those in the primary equation. It furthermore allows the idiosyncratic errors to be 
serially correlated and heterogeneously distributed in both equations.
8 
                                                 
8 Further estimators correcting for sample selection have been proposed by Kyriazidou (1997) and 
Rochina-Barrachina (1999). Dustmann & Rochina-Barrachina (2000) reconsider and extend the above- 
mentioned estimators. They allow for additive, individual-specific effects in both the (binary) selection 
equation and the equation of interest, and at the same time, for the equation of interest being defined for a 
non-random sub-population. Wooldridge & Semikyna (2005) contribute further to the existing discussion 
of sample selection in panel data models, taking into account the problem of endogeneity as well.  THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 9 
 
Since the decision to stay out of the labour force might be correlated with motherhood, a 
problem of endogenous sample selection could arise. The test for endogeneity of self-selection 
is carried out and if necessary, the correction method by Wooldridge (1995) is applied as 
below.
9 
1)  First, the probability of participating in the labour force is estimated separately for each 
year, i.e. for each year labour force participation is regressed by age, age squared, 
education, year dummies and the number of children using a probit estimator:
10  
Pit (Workingit=1) = γ* Zit + vit                (4) 
Using the results of the probit estimation the inverse mills ratio λ(δ*Xit) can be calculated 
for every individual in every year.  
2)  The fixed-effect estimation is applied including the inverse mills ratio λ (δ*Xit) as a 
further control and using only those observations in which the woman is working:  
Yit = β1*Pre1it+β2*Birth11it+β3*Post1it + ρ* λ (δ*Xit) + δ*Xit + ai + uit   (5) 
Using a t-statistic, a test can be run for the null hypothesis of no sample selection, i.e. if 
the coefficient of the inverse mills ratio is not significantly different from 0 (H0: ρ = 0). In 
the case where the null hypothesis can be rejected, a correction procedure is used, which 
maintains the estimated inverse mills ratio in the regression equation (equation (5)).
11  
4.2  Determination of amenities and disamenities: Satisfaction  
regressions 
After having shown that pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary job characteristics change after 
motherhood, it has to be tested whether both, as the theory of compensating wage differentials 
predicts, jointly determine the utility of a worker. In cases where a mother may be willing to 
sacrifice some of her income for obtaining better job features, these have to raise the utility for 
her to compensate the loss of income. Whether (and if so how) certain job characteristics enter 
the utility function of mothers is tested by estimating satisfaction regressions. Job satisfaction 
will serve as a proxy for utility. It is measured on a scale from 0 (not satisfied) to 10 (very 
satisfied). Information about job satisfaction is gained from the following question in the 
GSOEP: “How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your life? Please answer by 
using the following scale, in which 0 means totally unhappy and 10 means totally happy. How 
satisfied are you with your job?” 
The question is completely subjective, an issue that raises a big discussion about the use of 
satisfaction measures in scientific research. Nevertheless, the way of measuring job satisfaction 
accurately has been investigated a good deal in the literature.  
                                                 
9 See Wooldridge (1995), procedure 3.2.  
10 Regressions have been carried out for two different specifications of the reduced form: on the one hand, 
as proposed by Wooldridge, the above-mentioned control variables have been introduced for all years. 
This increases the explanative power of the probit regression but leads to a reduction of the sample since 
we do not have observations of many individuals for all years. On the other hand, control variables have 
been used only for the same years, an approach that has the opposite advantage. The results are similar, so 
for simplicity, the results of the second specification are presented; however, the results of the first 
specification are available upon request. 
11 The standard error correction (i.e. calculating variance covariance matrix) is still pending. 10 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
The first point of discussion has been the category of the variable: psychologists and 
sociologists have usually interpreted satisfaction scores as cardinal and comparable across 
respondents. Therefore, in order to identify the determinants of satisfaction they usually apply 
ordinary least squares estimation. Economists, however, have considered satisfaction as an 
ordinal variable, which has prompted them to use ordered latent-response models. The second 
problem is the subjectivity of satisfaction as well as self-reported job characteristics, because it 
is problematic to compare subjectively biased variables across individuals. Ferrer-i-Carbonell & 
Frijters (2004) argue that the first issue – whether ordinality or cardinality should be applied – 
does not matter, but unobserved individual heterogeneity does. Taking advantage of 
longitudinal datasets and applying panel data methods can solve this problem. 
The fact that the GSOEP provides annual information on job satisfaction as well as on a range 
of job characteristics allows a fairly accurate measurement to be made of the determinants of a 
mother’s utility function. Job satisfaction is determined as the function below: 
Pr (job satisfaction = n) = β1* Z ijt + β2*X it + c i + u it                 (6) 
         where    n = (0, 10) 
     Z ijt = individual job characteristics 
     X  it = individual personal attributes 
     c  i = individual unobserved effect 
     u  it = individual time-varying error 
In order to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity, following Ferrer-i-Cabonell & 
Frijters (2004) a fixed-effect estimation method is applied.
12 Job satisfaction is regressed on the 
set of amenities that changes around the first birth and a set of other controls (such as age, age 
squared, years of education, origin, partner, Pre and Post period dummy and a set of year 
dummies). The results are reported in section 5.2.2. 
4.3  Compensating wage differentials: Hedonic wage regressions 
Once the job characteristics that mothers consider as amenities have been determined, the last 
step is to measure the actual compensating wage differential for amenities, i.e. how much 
income a mother is willing to sacrifice to have pleasant working conditions. This is done by 
regressing the logarithm of wage on the same set of control variables, but this time it is also 
performed on all the amenities that change around the first birth and explain satisfaction with 
the job. These augmented wage regressions – hedonic wage regressions – represent the basic 
approach to estimating compensating wage differentials. 
The measurement of compensating wage differentials has likewise been discussed in the 
economic literature and several methods for addressing different problems of the estimation 
have been suggested. Brown (1981) and Duncan & Holmlund (1983) applied different 
methodologies, such as the within- or first-difference estimator, in order to take into account the 
subjectivity of self-reported job characteristics and omitted variables revealing workers’ 
attributes. A further issue is the abstraction from job search and labour market imperfections. 
Hwang, Mortensen & Reed (1998) developed a model including job search. Their analysis 
shows that the estimates resulting from a standard hedonic wage model may be biased and that 
the size of the bias is substantially determined by labour market parameters such as the 
probability of finding a job or the heterogeneity between firms with respect to cost efficiency. 
                                                 
12 The ordered logit fixed-effect estimator suggested by Ferrer-i-Cabonell & Frijters (2004) has also been 
applied; however, the log likelihood maximisation did not converge. THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 11 
 
For this reason, Villanueva (2004) took only the sample of job leavers into account. Owing to 
the small sample size, however, it is not possible to estimate compensating wage differentials 
after the first birth when looking only at the women who change their job.  
As a first approach, a hedonic wage regression is estimated, which takes unobserved individual 
heterogeneity into consideration by applying the fixed-effect method. Sample selection bias is 
tested for by applying the test suggested by Wooldridge (1995). The estimated function is the 
following: 
Yit = β1*Pre1it+β2*Birth11it+β3*Post1it + γ*Amenities it + δ*Xit + ai + uit           (7) 
The independent variable, as the name hedonic wage regression clearly indicates, is the 
logarithm of the gross wage rate. The Pre1, Birth1 and Post1 variables again represent dummies 
for the periods around first birth. The remaining set of controls Xit consists of the same variables 
as before (marital status, years of education, age, age squared, origin and a set of year dummies 
for 1985-2003). As amenities, the job characteristics that change around the first birth are 
included (see section 5.2.1).  
The next section reports the description of the sample and the results of all three steps for testing 
the hypothesis that the child penalty might be a compensating wage differential. 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary  statistics 
The sample
13 consists of 2,824 women (11,855 observations) of which 1,895 are mothers. Table 
A3 in the appendix gives an overview of the summary statistics of the sample.  
The first major difference between mothers and non-mothers is the percentage of women who 
have a partner. While more than 70% of mothers have a partner, almost 50% of the non-mothers 
are single. The non-mothers are also younger (age 30) than the mothers (age 35). This reflects a 
shortcoming of the sample, as previously noted, in that non-mothers could still choose to 
become mothers after 2003. The mean age given at the first birth is 27.8 years, which is quite 
young compared with the current average in Germany (of 29.4 years for married and 27.7 years 
for unmarried women in 2004).
14 This can be explained by the fact that the mean age at the first 
birth in our sample is an average of the last 20 years, whereas age at the first birth has risen 
substantially. The sample also closely reflects the true composition of ‘nationalities’ in 
Germany: around 65% of the women are West German and around 21% are East German. The 
fact that 21% of the mothers are East German reflects that for a long time, East Germany had a 
high birth rate. During the last decade, however, it has declined dramatically. The rest of the 
women are foreigners. On average women went to school for 11 years, which corresponds to an 
intermediate educational level that allows for professional formation. Little difference is 
observed between women with and without children with respect to education. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Since women who are not working drop out of the sample, the descriptive statistics only include 
working women. 
14 All data for comparison purposes are taken from the website http://www.destatis.de. 12 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
5.2 Regression  results 
5.2.1 Event study 
The first step to testing whether mothers may substitute income for certain job amenities is to 
estimate whether job characteristics change with motherhood. A summary of statistics for all 
job characteristics can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.  
Before looking at non-pecuniary job characteristics it is necessary to determine the child penalty 
for the sample of working women between ages 16 and 45. The ln of real gross and net wage
15 
rates are estimated, taking into consideration contracted hours.
16 Using agreed hours has the 
advantage that there are no extreme outliers,
17 but it may not reflect the true amount of hours 
worked. The logarithm of real gross wage for mothers is 2.84 (net 2.42), while for non-mothers 
it is 2.81 (net 2.38). 
The effect of motherhood on wages applying fixed effects to equation (3) is estimated, which 
includes control variables for individual attributes such as age, age squared, marital status, years 
of education, origin and a set of year dummies. The resulting effect (β3-β1) represents the child 
penalty. Also conducted is a significance test for the child penalty. In addition, equation (5) is 
estimated in order to see whether the results are biased due to sample selection. As we can see 
in Table 1, where the regression results are shown (including and not including the inverse mills 
ratio), the t-statistic of the inverse mills ratio is significantly less than 2 for both gross and net 
wage rates. Thus, the hypothesis of there being no sample selection cannot be rejected. More 
detailed results can be found in Table A5 in the appendix. 
The empirical evidence of the child penalty is once again confirmed. After the first birth 
mothers face a loss in gross wage rates of 20% (which is the difference between the coefficients 
of the Post1 and the Pre1 variable in the first column of Table 1) with respect to their pre-birth 
wage rates. In net terms the child penalty is milder but still significant (the child penalty in the 
third column is 9%). This is clearly the result of tax reductions and family subsidies.  
Recent findings by Kunze & Ejrnaes (2004) of a wage dip even before the first birth can be 
confirmed. In a regression where the years around the first birth are split (from five years prior 
to six years after the first birth)
18 we can see that gross wages start to fall two years before the 
first birth. In addition, the child penalty grows stronger over the years, even if, as we have seen 
before, labour force participation rises over the years after the first birth. So it seems that only 
women for whom the opportunity costs of not working would be high continue to work around 
the first birth. Furthermore, the women who later come back to work are penalised even more so 
because of the loss in human capital associated with a longer career interruption.  
As previously mentioned, three different categories of (dis)amenities suggested by the literature 
on compensating wage differentials are of specific interest: working schedule, workload and 
flexibility of the job.
19 Before reporting the regression results a short overview is given of the 
average characteristics of the jobs held by mothers and non-mothers.  
                                                 
15 Net wages are defined as gross wages (the wage rate agreed with the employer) minus ancillary wages 
(Lohnnebenkosten), such as social security and insurance, minus taxes (income and payroll taxes, etc.). 
16 The descriptive statistics for ln of real gross and net wage rates can be found in Table A4 in the 
appendix. 
17 Nevertheless, the observations of real wage rates are limited to the values above the 0.5 percentile and 
below the 99.5 percentile. 
18 Results for this regression are shown in Table A6 in the appendix. 
19 The summary statistics of the job characteristics can be found in Table A4 in the appendix. THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 13 
 
Table 1. Results of fixed-effect estimation for ln of real gross and net wage rate 
  Ln of real gross 
wage rate 
Ln of real gross 
wage rate 
Ln of real net 
wage rate 
Ln of real net 
wage rate 
Pre1  0.007  0.009 0.002 0.001 
  (0.33)  (0.43) (0.09) (0.07) 
Post1 -0.196  -0.196  -0.09  -0.09 
  (8.63)**  (8.64)** (4.40)** (4.40)** 
Child penalty  -0.203**  -0.205** -0.092** -0.091** 
Inverse mills 
ratio  – 0.055  –  -0.009 
 –  (1.1)  –  (0.19) 
Constant  0.208  0.112 0.324 0.339 
 (2.61)**  (0.96)  (4.48)**  (3.19)** 
Observations 11,855  11,855 11,718 11,718 
#  of  individuals  2,824  2,824 2,824 2,824 
R-squared  0.49  0.49 0.52 0.52 
Notes: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient; * indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 
5% level and ** at a 1% level. A set of control variables are also included – age, age squared, partner, years of 
education, origin and set of year dummies for 1985-2003. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
In general, the contract of non-mothers includes more hours per week than that of mothers (37 
hours vs. 32 hours). The actual working hours (agreed hours plus overtime) of non-mothers 
exceed those of mothers even more (by more than 6 hours per week). Women with children are 
also less likely to work during inconvenient hours such as in the evening (after 6 p.m.) or at 
night (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.). They are, however, more likely to engage in shift work, which might 
possibly allow for more flexibility and thus a better combination of career and family. Almost 
none of them enjoy flexible working hours (not even 1%). This reflects how regulated the 
German labour market is, or put more precisely, has been over the last 20 years. Nevertheless, 
more than 11% of the mothers and almost 8% of the non-mothers work from home. Mothers 
also live closer to their job (11.4 km vs. 14.7 km), which allows them to save time. This could 
be important, since time is a scarce resource for mothers who have to combine a family and job. 
With respect to workload there are no great differences between mothers and non-mothers: 
around 70% of the women (70% of non-mothers vs. 68% of the mothers) consider their work as 
stressful, while only 34% of mothers and 26% of non-mothers see it as physically demanding. 
Mothers may judge their work as more physically demanding owing to the double load of work 
and domestic activities. Mothers are also slightly more likely to report bad working conditions 
(25 vs. 23.6%). 
Before analysing the results of the event study analysis, it has to be noted that most of the job 
characteristics are only observed for a few years. Shift work and the variables for workload 
(stress, physical demand and bad working conditions) are observed for the years 1985, 1987, 
1989, 1995 and 2001, and work in the evening and during night only for the years 1990, 1995 
and 2000. Only in three years (1997, 1999 and 2002) were women asked if they work from 
home. In order to maximise the sample size, the following technique has been applied to impute 
these job characteristics.
20 A new variable, called ‘job change’ has been created, which enables 
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the determination of the years in which a woman holds the same job. Using this variable, the job 
characteristics reported for only certain years can be extended to all the years in which a woman 
retains the same job.  
In order to see how motherhood affects these job characteristics, a fixed-effect method is 
applied to equation (3) regressing all (dis)amenities on the same set of control variables as 
before (age, age squared, marital status, years of education, origin and a set of year dummies). 
Furthermore, equation (5) is used, which includes the inverse mills ratio, in order to test and 
correct for a possible sample selection bias. Results for the characteristics that significantly 
change around the first birth are shown in Table 2. The table only presents the regression results 
that have been corrected for possible sample selection (if correction was necessary), i.e. if the 
null hypothesis of no sample selection could not be rejected without the inverse mills ratio, and 
in the case of rejection with the inverse mills ratio included.
21 The results for all job 
characteristics are listed in Table A7 (a-c) in the appendix.  
Table 2. Results of fixed-effect estimation for (dis)amenities 
  Actual hours  Night 
work 
Evening 
work   Stress  Bad 
conditions  Distance 
Pre1 1.616  0.033  0.03  0.028  0.015  -0.075 
 (2.99)**  (2.49)*  (1.4)  (1.07)  (0.58)  (0.1) 
Post1 -12.606  -0.029  -0.041  -0.092  -0.034  -1.157 
 (22.64)**  (2.12)*  (1.88)  (3.44)**  (1.3)  (1.54) 
Change in job 
characteristics  -14.222** -0.062** -0.071**  -0.12** -0.049** -1.082** 
Inv. mills ratio  -4.058  0.122  –  –  –  – 
 (3.34)**  (4.10)**  –  –  –  – 
Constant 50.037  -0.334  -0.62  1.52  0.817  18.774 
 (17.35)**  (4.73)**  (8.10)**  (16.18)**  (8.98)**  (7.10)** 
Observations 11,855  11,855  11,855 11,855  11,855 11,855 
No. of 
individuals   2,824 2,824  2,824 2,824  2,824  2,824 
R-squared 0.18  0.06  0.14  0.43  0.1  0.04 
Notes: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient; * indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 
5% level and ** at a 1% level. The set of control variables also includes age, age squared, partner, years of 
education, origin and a set of year dummies for 1985-2003. 
This table only presents the results for variables that change significantly around the first birth. Also estimated 
are the changes around the first birth for shift work, physical demand, work from home and flexible working 
schedule. The signs of the coefficients are as expected (negative for the variables representing workload and 
positive for the ones on flexibility), but not significant. The results can be seen in Table A7 (a-c) in the 
appendix. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
The results of the event study show significant changes around the first birth for the 
characteristics of all three categories.  
As already seen in the descriptive statistics, women tend to work less after having a child. We 
can observe a strong and significant decrease in working hours after the first birth. In addition, 
mothers seem to avoid a working schedule outside the usual working hours (8 a.m. to 6 p.m.). In 
other words, they work less during the evening and at night. Mothers also seem to avoid a heavy 
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workload. Once becoming a mother, their work tends to be significantly less stressful and offer 
better working conditions. The result for physical demand is only significant at the 15% level, 
but indicates that a mother sees her work as a greater burden than a non-mother. The double 
workload of job and domestic activities may explain this finding.  
Mothers seem to appreciate jobs that allow for a certain degree of flexibility as well. The 
possibility of working from home seems to be attractive for women once they have a child. The 
result is only significant at the 15% level, but has a positive sign. (A further indication for trying 
to decrease the time spent at work is the fact that the distance to the workplace decreases once a 
woman gives birth to her first child.) The result for flexible hours is not significant. The reason 
for this finding may be that not many women enjoy flexible working hours. Flexible working 
hours have only recently become common, which reflects the general inflexibility of the 
German labour market.  
These results show that job characteristics change around the first birth. Given the significant 
changes in job features around that time, it is reasonable to think that mothers may substitute the 
loss of income with more amenities. Furthermore, looking at regressions where the years around 
the time of the first birth are more split (into five years before and six years after the first birth), 
the change in mothers’ job characteristics around the arrival of their first child seem strategic. 
Several non-wage job characteristics, such as actual working hours, stress and bad working 
conditions begin to change as early as the year before the first birth. This provides an intuitive 
contradiction against the possible endogeneity of fertility, i.e. against the concern that wage and 
career opportunities might determine the decision to have a baby. It seems that mothers plan the 
first birth rather than a negative shock in wages leading to a decision to have children. 
Having determined which job characteristics change after motherhood, it is still necessary to 
show how these characteristics affect mothers’ utility. The next section presents the results of 
the satisfaction regression. These estimates show which job features are viewed as amenities 
and thus might compensate for a loss in income. 
5.2.2 Satisfaction regression 
In order to determine how certain job characteristics contribute to the utility of women, 
especially when becoming a mother, satisfaction regressions are estimated. As previously 
mentioned, the fact that the GSOEP provides annual information on job satisfaction as well as 
on a range of job characteristics means that it allows a fairly accurate measurement of the 
determinants of a mother’s utility function. Assuming ordinality of the error terms, a fixed-
effect estimation is applied using equation (7). The results can be found in Table 3.
22 
As expected, wage has a strong impact on job satisfaction. Yet, some non-wage aspects also 
have a strong effect on the happiness of mothers with their job and thus mothers may be willing 
to sacrifice some of their income for them. Looking at the results of the fixed-effect regressions, 
certain job characteristics are clearly determined as disamenities. A heavy workload, as assessed 
by stress and bad working conditions, is held to be significantly dissatisfactory (at a 1% and a 
10% significance level) by mothers. The rest of the estimates are not significant, but the signs of 
certain variables indicate that mothers try to avoid these job aspects. Work during the night and 
a long commuting time decrease the utility function of a mother. Working in the evening seems 
to be favoured by mothers as well as more working hours, which is not as expected, but the 
result is not significant either.  
 
                                                 
22 Here again, the ordered logit fixed-effect estimator suggested by Ferrer-i-Cabonell & Frijters (2004) 
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Table 3. Satisfaction regression 
  Job satisfaction 
Ln of real gross wage  0.3454 
 (4.58)** 
Actual working hours/week  0.0002 
 (0.06) 
Night work  -0.0020 
 (-0.01) 
Work in the evening  0.1342 
 (1.61) 
Stressful job  -0.1271 
 (-2.03)** 
Bad working conditions  -0.1120 
  (-1.73) 
Distance to workplace  -0.0013 
 (-0.59) 
Observations 11,855 
Number of individuals  2,824 
PseudoR2 0.0099 
Notes: Also included are age, age squared, marital status, years of education, origin and a set of year dummies. T-
statistics are reported in brackets; * indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% level and ** at a 1% 
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Summarising the results, mothers seem to have a strong preference for convenient, family-
friendly job characteristics. The significant results have shown that mothers dislike heavy 
workloads. Furthermore, time seems to be a scarce and thus valuable resource for mothers. 
Since we now know which characteristics are more frequently sought after motherhood, those 
that seem to be amenities and those that are disamenities, how much mothers are willing to 
sacrifice their income in order to have a pleasant job can be measured. Afterwards, the results of 
the hedonic wage regressions are presented.  
5.2.3 Hedonic wage regression 
The last step in order to test the hypothesis of the child penalty as a compensating wage 
differential is to measure the price that mothers are willing to pay for certain amenities and to 
estimate the child penalty taking into account these amenities. Therefore a hedonic wage 
regression is estimated, taking into consideration unobserved individual heterogeneity by 
applying the fixed-effect method to equation (7). As amenities, the variables for all job 
characteristics that change significantly around the first birth are included, which are, as 
determined in section 5.2.2, actual hours worked per week, dummies for night work, work in the 
evening, stress and bad working conditions and lastly a variable for the distance to the 
workplace. Sample selection bias is tested for by applying the technique suggested by 
Wooldridge (1995). Since the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias cannot be rejected, a 
correction is not necessary. Table 4 shows the results for the variables of most interest (further 
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Table 4. Hedonic wage regression including disamenities 
  Ln of real gross wage rate  Ln of real gross wage rate 
Pre1 0.007  0.005 
 (0.33)  (0.24) 
Post1 -0.196  -0.177 
 (8.63)**  (7.61)** 
Child penalty  -0.203**  -0.182** 
Actual hours worked  –  0.001 
 –  (2.74)** 
Night work  –  -0.038 
 –  (1.62) 
Work in the evening  –  -0.006 
 –  (0.48) 
Stressful job  –  0.033 
 –  (3.74)** 
Bad conditions  –  0.014 
 –  (1.52) 
Distance to workplace –  0.001 
 –  (4.22)** 
Constant 0.208  0.062 
 (2.61)**  (0.74) 
Observations 11,855  11,855 
No. of individuals  2,824  2,824 
R-squared 0.49  0.5 
Notes: T-statistics are reported in brackets; * indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% level and ** at a 1% 
level. Further control variables are age, age squared, partner, years of education, origin and a set of year 
dummies (1985-2003). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Comparing the first and second columns shows that including the disamenities that change 
significantly around the first birth diminishes the child penalty by almost 10% (from -0.203 to -
0.182). This may indicate the willingness of mothers to sacrifice some income for amenities.  
It can be confirmed that mothers seem to avoid heavy workloads – having a stressful job raises 
the wage rate by more than 3% and bad working conditions lead to an increase by more than 
1%. The results of the event study with respect to time are also reflected by the results of the 
hedonic wage regression: time seems to be a scarce and valuable resource for a woman when 
becoming a mother. One more hour of work per week requires a wage increase of 0.1% and one 
kilometre of distance to the workplace also has to be compensated by an increase of 0.1% in the 
wage rate. The results for an inconvenient working schedule are not consistent with the theory 
of compensating wage differentials. The coefficients of night work and work in the evening are 
both negative, which would mean that a woman who works during these late hours would be 
paid less. That being said, neither of the coefficients of these disamenities is significant.  
Looking at these results, we can see that taking into account several disamenities decreases the 
child penalty by almost 10%. Yet, the difference between the child penalty estimated for the 18 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
‘raw’ child penalty and the one accounting for amenities is not significant at a 90% confidence 
interval.
23 Still, the results of the hedonic wage regression support the hypothesis of the child 
penalty as a compensating wage differential. Mothers seem to be willing to sacrifice some of 
their income for amenities and thus the gap in wages between women with and without children 
shrinks and their wages are more similar. 
The results of hedonic wage regressions, as mentioned in section 4.3, have to be interpreted 
carefully. As Hwang, Mortensen & Reed (1998) pointed out, hedonic wage regressions assume 
a static labour market in which workers make a decision when accepting a job that is both one-
time and forever. In reality, the labour market is pretty dynamic: workers search for better jobs 
and firms for more productive workers, such that there is a constant turnover. This may give rise 
to incentives for firms to offer jobs differing in wages or amenities (or both). But firms may 
differ in their cost efficiency in producing certain amenities. Thus, a more cost-efficient firm 
could offer jobs that are better paid and have more amenities as well. Since the standard hedonic 
wage regression omits the heterogeneity between firms with respect to the cost-efficiency 
factors that may in turn positively influence the wage, the estimated price of the amenities could 
be underestimated or even wrongly signed. This could explain why it seems that mothers value 
amenities (or dislike disamenities) only very little or not at all as in the case of evening and 
night work.  
Finally, it may be useful to know how much the hypothesis of the child penalty as a 
compensating wage differential contributes to explaining the remaining family gap after 
controlling for existing explanations. As previously noted, the following hypotheses have 
already been investigated: reduced work experience, less effort owing to the dual workload of 
job and home activities, sector segregation and having further children. The results of the 
regressions including these alternative hypotheses in detail are not reported here since that is 
beyond the scope of this work.
24 The contribution of the new hypothesis is notable, however, 
taking into account other previously documented explanations. The existing hypotheses, 
especially the depreciation of human capital, decrease the child penalty by more than 40%. 
Inclusion of the amenities adds even more to knowledge about the unexplained gap between 
mothers and non-mothers. The child penalty is further reduced by 20% and women suffer only a 
loss in wages of less than 7% as a result of motherhood. Taking into account all the hypotheses 
so far documented shows that mothers seem to be willing to sacrifice income for a more 
pleasant job. 
6. Conclusions 
The balance of career and family life is a topic on the current political agenda. One indication of 
the fact that mothers still encounter barriers to success in the labour market is the child penalty – 
i.e. mothers earn lower wages than women without children. Even if there are several 
hypotheses about its causes, much remains unexplained. Yet few researchers have studied the 
characteristics of the jobs held by mothers and non-mothers and thus have not investigated the 
idea that mothers might prefer jobs that differ with respect to certain job aspects. Knowledge 
about the job characteristics that are advantageous for mothers and for which they may be 
willing to sacrifice some of their income would be useful for better specifying the causes of the 
child penalty and for designing effective family policies.  
The contribution of this study is to determine whether mothers might substitute income for non-
pecuniary job characteristics that they deem advantageous. An attempt has been make to test the 
                                                 
23 The 90% confidence interval for specification (1) is [-0.234; -0.172]; the same interval for specification 
(9), including the amenities, is [-0.215; -0.149]. 
24 Detailed results of the regressions, including alternative hypotheses, are available upon request. THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 19 
 
hypothesis that if the labour market rewards disamenities, some degree of the child penalty may 
be a compensating wage differential for those disamenities that mothers wish to avoid.  
In order to test this hypothesis, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel has been used, 
which provides detailed information about personal attributes and job characteristics, with 
attention given to the wage and non-wage features of jobs as well as job satisfaction. Its 
longitudinal nature allows the comparison of women before and after the birth of their first 
child.  
Using a sample of women aged 16 to 46, an event study has been undertaken to analyse the 
changes in wages and several other non-wage job aspects around the first birth. The child 
penalty in this sample reaches 20% when comparing the gross wage rates of women before and 
after the first birth. Several job characteristics seem to change as well around the first birth. A 
sharp decline can be observed in working hours after the first birth, which can be explained by 
reduced overtime and more part-time contracts. Mothers also work less at inconvenient working 
hours (i.e. after 6 p.m. or at night). This result could indicate that during these hours it is 
difficult to arrange childcare. Furthermore, when becoming a mother a woman is more likely to 
have a job that is close to her home. This enables her to save some time, which must be divided 
between job and family responsibilities. Finally, the results suggest that mothers may tend to 
avoid a stressful job and bad working conditions. 
The results of the satisfaction regression give insight into how a mother might evaluate certain 
job characteristics. Significant results, however, can only be found for wage and workload. 
Mothers gain satisfaction from jobs associated with less stress and better working conditions. 
The coefficients for all other job characteristics are not significant, but point in the expected 
direction: working during inconvenient hours decreases satisfaction, as does a longer 
commuting time. Even if these results are in many cases insignificant, they are useful in 
supporting the hypothesis of a compensating wage differential for disamenities.  
The last step of the work has been to estimate the trade-off between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job characteristics. Including disamenities in the wage regression decreases the child 
penalty by 10%. These results show that mothers are willing to sacrifice some of their wages for 
certain amenities such as fewer working hours, less stress and a shorter commuting time to 
work. They further indicate that some of the wage penalty may be a compensating wage 
differential for more amenities in the jobs held by mothers. 
A future aim is to take the dynamic feature of the labour market into account when measuring 
the compensating wage differential. One method might be to consider only job changers in 
order to capture the turnover in the labour market. Yet since the sample size of mothers who are 
observed around the first birth and at the same time as they switch jobs is quite small, it would 
be reasonable to extend the sample to all mothers or even to all women switching jobs and to 
apply the methodology proposed by Villanueva (2004). He derives bounds on the monetary 
returns to job disamenities for workers who switch jobs voluntarily. In case a worker chooses a 
job with more (fewer) disamenities, his wage change gives an upper (lower) bound of the 
market return for the disamenity. 
An alternative method to estimating workers’ marginal willingness to pay for certain job 
features in a dynamic environment is to look at duration data. Gronberg & Reed (1994), for 
instance, derive the impact of wage and amenities on job tenure. Using the marginal effect of 
wage and amenities on the probability of quitting a job, they can calculate workers’ marginal 
willingness to pay for job characteristics. In order to analyse whether a mother may be willing 
to substitute some wages for amenities, it would be useful to look at how the amenities 
associated with a woman’s job before the start of maternity leave influences the duration of the 20 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
time spent out of the labour force. The hypothesis to be tested would be as follows: the more 
amenities offered by a mother’s job,
25 the shorter will be the leave period taken.  
One further extension could be to introduce some dynamic factors into the equation accounting 
for the fact that a woman might plan her career according to her future family aspirations. The 
econometric method accounting for this autocorrelation would be a dynamic panel estimation 
such as the Arellano–Bond estimator (1991). 
The addition this study makes to the current literature is its investigation of the child penalty as 
a compensating wage differential. Among the research about the child penalty this study takes 
(dis)amenities into consideration for the first time. The knowledge gained about the preferences 
of mothers with respect to job amenities and the price they are willing to pay for them shows 
that when becoming mothers women might be willing to substitute some of their income for 
amenities – thus to some degree the child penalty may be a compensating wage differential. 
This insight provides a basis for designing an effective family policy that should allow mothers 
a better combination of career and family life. 
 
                                                 
25 What is referred to here is the job a mother is holding, or more specifically the job that a mother has 
guaranteed when starting maternity leave. | 21 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1. Definition and construction of variables 
Name of variable  Definition & construction 
Pecuniary aspects   
Ln of real gross wage rate 
 
Ln of ((monthly gross income/weekly contracted working hours)*31/7) 
 
Ln of real net wage rate 
 
Ln of ((monthly net income/weekly contracted working hours)*31/7) 
 
Non-pecuniary aspects   
1) Time 
 
 
Actual hours worked 
 
 
Weekly working hours including overtime, but not illness or holidays 
 
Work in the evening 
Binary variable indicating if worked between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.; 
variable has been made binary – before there were three categories 
(never, occasionally and frequently) 
 
Night work 
Binary variable indicating if worked after 10 p.m.; variable has been 
made binary – before there were three categories (never, occasionally 
and frequently) 
 
Shift work 
Binary variable indicating if shift work; variable has been made binary 
– before there were three categories (never, occasionally and 
frequently) 
 
2) Workload   
Stress at work 
Binary variable indicating if job is stressful; variable has been made 
binary – before there were three categories (not at all, partly and fully) 
 
Physical demand of job 
Binary variable indicating if job is physically demanding; variable has 
been made binary – before there were three categories (not at all, partly 
and fully) 
 
Bad working conditions 
Binary variable indicating if worker is exposed to bad working 
conditions like heat, gases, etc.; variable has been made binary – before 
there were three categories (not at all, partly and fully) 
 
3) Flexibility   
Flexible working hours 
Binary variable indicating if schedule can be set freely or if hours are 
set 
 
Work from home 
Binary variable indicating if work from home is possible; variable has 
been made binary – before there were three categories (not possible, 
occasionally and frequently) 
 
Distance to workplace  Distance to workplace in kilometres 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 24 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
Table A2. Labour force participation 
Year  Mean labour force participation (%) 
Yr5 pre-birth  79.41 
Yr4 pre-birth  83.51 
Yr3 pre-birth  84.69 
Yr2 pre-birth  84.44 
Yr1 pre-birth  83.35 
Birth1 35.60 
Yr1 post-birth  26.43 
Yr2 post-birth  37.67 
Yr3 post-birth  40.62 
Yr4 post-birth  45.76 
Yr5 post-birth  48.30 
Yr6 post-birth  53.43 
Yr18 post-birth  64.21 
Note: The set of control variables also includes age, age squared, origin, 
years of education, marital status and a set of year dummies. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Table A3. Summary statistics of the sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Age 11,855  33.4351  7.3250  16  46 
Partner 11,855  0.7259  0.4461  0  1 
Years of education  11,855  11.1082  3.7764  0  18 
West 11,855  0.6517  0.4764  0  1 
East 11,855  0.2152  0.4110  0  1 
Foreigner 11,855  0.1005  0.3007  0  1 
Immigrant 11,855  0.0326  0.1775  0  1 
Pre 11,855  0.1232  0.3287  0  1 
Birth 11,855  0.0137  0.1165  0  1 
Post 11,855  0.5289  0.4992  0  1 
 
 
Non-
mothers Mothers  Pre1  Birth1  Post1 
Age  30.1740  35.0715 25.2676 27.7607 37.5459 
Partner  0.5110  0.8337 0.6557 0.8650 0.8743 
Years  of  education  11.1184  11.1031 10.4689 10.8160 11.2584 
West  0.7518  0.6015 0.7618 0.7117 0.5612 
East  0.1134  0.2663 0.1034 0.1595 0.3070 
Foreigner  0.1070  0.0973 0.1246 0.1104 0.0906 
Immigrant  0.0278  0.0350 0.0103 0.0184 0.0411 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
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Table A4. Descriptive dependent variables 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Ln of real gross wage rate  11,855  2.8302  0.5020  0.6495  4.3317 
Ln of real net wage rate  11,855  2.4038  0.4639  0.6495  3.9700 
Actual working hours/week  11,855  35.6368  10.0400  3  70 
Agreed working hours/week  11,855  33.4523  8.7909  4  48 
Shift work  11,855  0.1559  0.3628  0  1 
Night work  11,855  0.0972  0.2962  0  1 
Work in the evening  11,855  0.2393  0.4267  0  1 
Stressful job  11,855  0.6920  0.4617  0  1 
Physically demanding job  11846  0.3125  0.4635  0  1 
Bad working conditions  11,855  0.2463  0.4309  0  1 
Flexible hours  11821  0.0047  0.0681  0  1 
Work from home  11,855  0.1007  0.3010  0  1 
Distance to workplace  11,855 12.5246  13.3521  0  120 
 
 
Non-
mothers  Mothers Pre1  Birth1  Post1 
Ln of real gross wage rate  2.812  2.838  2.813  2.883  2.843 
Ln of real net wage rate  2.376  2.417  2.407  2.4398  2.4194 
Actual  working  hours/week  39.797  33.549 39.682 37.570 32.015 
Agreed working hours/week  37.143  31.606 37.983 35.661 30.017 
Shift  work  0.135  0.166 0.145 0.214 0.169 
Night  work  0.106  0.092 0.059 0.092 0.100 
Work in the evening  0.262  0.227  0.138  0.177  0.249 
Stressful  job  0.700  0.687 0.789 0.791 0.661 
Physically  demanding  job  0.263  0.337 0.357 0.374 0.331 
Bad  working  conditions  0.236  0.251 0.314 0.288 0.235 
Flexible  hours  0.006  0.003 0.008 0.006 0.002 
Work  from  home  0.078  0.112 0.123 0.134 0.108 
Distance to workplace  14.741  11.412 13.685 14.478 10.802 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
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Table A5. Child penalty – Results of fixed-effect regressions 
  Ln real gross wage rate  Ln real gross wage rate  Ln real net wage rate  Ln real net wage rate
Pre1 0.007 0.009  0.002  0.001 
 -0.33  -0.43  -0.09  -0.07 
Post1 -0.196 -0.196  -0.09  -0.09 
 (8.63)**  (8.64)**  (4.40)**  (4.40)** 
Child penalty  -0.203 -0.205  -0.092  -0.091 
  significant significant  significant significant 
Mills ratio  –  0.055  –  -0.009 
 –  -1.1  –  -0.19 
Partner 0.018  0.014  -0.007  -0.006 
 -1.83  -1.36  -0.78  -0.67 
Years of 
education 0.01  0.011  0.005  0.005 
 (3.37)**  (3.53)**  (2.02)*  -1.79 
Age 0.138  0.141  0.114  0.114 
 (31.37)**  (28.89)**  (28.66)**  (25.90)** 
Age sq.  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
 (30.62)**  (29.99)**  (29.98)**  (29.04)** 
Yr 85  0.042  0.044  0.048  0.048 
 (2.09)*  (2.18)*  (2.64)**  (2.61)** 
Yr 86  0.123  0.125  0.12  0.12 
 (6.08)**  (6.15)**  (6.55)**  (6.51)** 
Yr 87  0.183  0.186  0.174  0.174 
 (9.27)**  (9.34)**  (9.79)**  (9.71)** 
Yr 88  0.197  0.2  0.196  0.195 
 (9.71)**  (9.77)**  (10.68)**  (10.59)** 
Yr 89  0.242  0.247  0.247  0.246 
 (12.67)**  (12.63)**  (14.33)**  (14.01)** 
Yr 90  0.277  0.286  0.313  0.312 
 (16.75)**  (15.49)**  (20.96)**  (18.72)** 
Yr 91  0.286  0.293  0.334  0.333 
 (17.54)**  (16.82)**  (22.70)**  (21.21)** 
Yr 92  0.334  0.337  0.358  0.357 
 (20.87)**  (20.73)**  (24.80)**  (24.37)** 
Yr 93  0.369  0.372  0.402  0.402 
 (24.01)**  (23.88)**  (29.03)**  (28.65)** 
Yr 94  0.385  0.385  0.406  0.406 
 (24.32)**  (24.34)**  (28.34)**  (28.31)** 
Yr 95  0.375  0.376  0.386  0.386 
 (32.77)**  (32.70)**  (37.36)**  (37.14)** 
Yr 96  0.437  0.438  0.43  0.43 
 (38.01)**  (37.98)**  (41.51)**  (41.37)** 
Yr 97  0.461  0.462  0.446  0.446 
 (34.40)**  (34.41)**  (36.86)**  (36.79)** 
Yr 98  0.501  0.501  0.479  0.479 
 (44.93)**  (44.93)**  (47.60)**  (47.59)** 
Yr 99  0.507  0.509  0.497  0.496 
 (38.49)**  (38.26)**  (41.75)**  (41.30)** 
Yr 00  0.541  0.54  0.528  0.528 
 (41.33)**  (41.29)**  (44.72)**  (44.70)** 
Yr 01  0.556  0.557  0.573  0.573 
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Table A5. Continued 
Yr 02  -0.052  -0.051  -0.037  -0.037 
 (5.68)**  (5.58)**  (4.52)**  (4.52)** 
Constant 0.208  0.112  0.324  0.339 
 (2.61)**  -0.96  (4.48)**  (3.19)** 
Observations 11,855  11,855  11,855  11,855 
Number 
fixed ID  2,824 2,824  2,824  2,824 
R-squared 0.49  0.49  0.52  0.52 
Notes: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient; a set of control variables are also included – age, age 
squared, years of education, origin and set of year dummies for 1985-2003. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Table A6. Child penalty over the years – Results of fixed-effect regressions 
  Ln of real gross wage rate 
Yr 5 pre-birth  0.027 
 (1.11) 
Yr 4 pre-birth  0.049 
 (2.02)* 
Yr 3 pre-birth  0.074 
 (2.99)** 
Yr 2 pre-birth  0.052 
 (1.97)* 
Yr 1 pre-birth  0.053 
 (1.97)* 
Birth1 0.038 
 (1.21) 
Yr 1 post-birth  -0.03 
 (0.81) 
Yr 2 post-birth  -0.075 
 (2.07)* 
Yr 3 post-birth  -0.089 
 (2.47)* 
Yr 4 post-birth  -0.127 
 (3.51)** 
Yr 5 post-birth  -0.164 
 (4.37)** 
Yr 6 post-birth  -0.176 
 (4.57)** 
Post 6  -0.28 
 (7.20)** 
Constant 0.472 
 (3.71)** 
Observations 7894 
Number of fixed ID  1895 
R-squared 0.48 
Notes: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient; a set of control variables are also included – age, age 
squared, years of education, origin and set of year dummies for 1985-2003. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 28 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
Table A7(a). Effect of motherhood on (dis)amenities – Work schedule 
  Actual hours  Shift work  Night work  Work in the evening 
Pre1 1.616  -0.026  0.033  0.03 
 (2.99)**  -1.25  (2.49)*  -1.4 
Post1 -12.606  -0.028  -0.029  -0.041 
 (22.64)**  -1.29  (2.12)*  -1.88 
Child penalty  -14.222  -0.002  -0.062  -0.071 
 significant  not  significant  significant  significant 
Mills ratio  -4.058  –  0.122  – 
 (3.34)**  –  (4.10)**  – 
Partner -0.968  0.018  0.013  0.019 
 (3.74)**  -1.91  (2.05)*  -1.94 
Years of education  -0.054  0.005  0.007  0.002 
 -0.69  -1.73  (3.48)**  -0.82 
Age -0.179  -0.008  0.008  0.035 
 -1.5  (1.96)*  (2.80)**  (8.27)** 
Age sq.  0.002  0  0  0 
 -0.96  -0.36  -0.57  (4.52)** 
Yr 85  -1.134  -0.006  -0.003  -0.018 
 (2.28)*  -0.29  -0.25  -0.93 
Yr 86  -0.722  0.012  -0.004  -0.031 
 -1.44  -0.64  -0.34  -1.57 
Yr 87  -1.222  0.014  -0.008  -0.047 
 (2.50)*  -0.75  -0.68  (2.45)* 
Yr 88  -1.448  0.024  -0.014  -0.068 
 (2.89)**  -1.28  -1.12  (3.47)** 
Yr 89  -1.094  0.04  -0.004  -0.077 
 (2.28)*  (2.24)*  -0.33  (4.21)** 
Yr 90  -2.332  0.053  -0.01  -0.097 
 (5.14)**  (3.41)**  -0.86  (6.08)** 
Yr 91  -1.886  0.046  -0.015  -0.086 
 (4.41)**  (3.00)**  -1.41  (5.49)** 
Yr 92  -1.224  0.06  -0.02  -0.089 
 (3.07)**  (4.00)**  (2.03)*  (5.80)** 
Yr 93  -0.862  0.08  -0.031  -0.118 
 (2.26)*  (5.55)**  (3.32)**  (7.97)** 
Yr 94  -1.255  0.07  -0.048  -0.147 
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Table A7(a). Continued 
Yr 95  -0.902  0.113  0.017  0.056 
 (3.19)**  (10.49)**  (2.51)*  (5.09)** 
Yr 96  -0.875  0.129  0.015  0.045 
 (3.09)**  (11.89)**  (2.11)*  (4.03)** 
Yr 97  -0.223  0.146  0.011  0.041 
 -0.67  (11.53)**  -1.35  (3.15)** 
Yr 98  -0.196  0.144  -0.007  0.014 
 -0.72  (13.71)**  -1.02  -1.31 
Yr 99  -0.842  0.15  -0.003  -0.011 
 (2.58)**  (12.08)**  -0.34  -0.89 
Yr 00  0.541  0.169  0.022  0.032 
 -1.68  (13.71)**  (2.75)**  (2.51)* 
Yr 01  0.107  0.2  0.011  0.021 
 -0.41  (20.22)**  -1.81  (2.13)* 
Yr 02  0.011  0.214  0.006  0.017 
 -0.05  (24.98)**  -1.03  -1.89 
Constant 50.037  0.297  -0.334  -0.62 
 (17.35)**  (3.96)**  (4.73)**  (8.10)** 
Observations 11,855  11,855  11,855  11,855 
# of Individuals  2,824  2,824  2,824  2,824 
R-squared 0.18  0.08  0.06  0.14 
Note: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Table A7(b). Effect of motherhood on (dis)amenities – Results of fixed-effect regressions 
concerning workload 
  Stressful job  Physical demand  Bad conditions 
Pre1 0.028  0.016  0.015 
 -1.07  -0.66  -0.58 
Post1 -0.092  0.045  -0.034 
 (3.44)**  -1.75  -1.3 
Child penalty  -0.12  0.029  -0.049 
  significant  significant at 15%  significant 
Partner 0.03  0.004  -0.015 
 (2.55)*  -0.38  -1.3 
Years of education  0.007  0.004  -0.009 
 -1.94  -1.22  (2.64)** 
Age -0.043  -0.024  -0.02 
 (8.26)**  (4.73)**  (3.96)** 
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Table A7(b). Continued 
 -1.35  -0.64  -0.82 
Yr 85  0.025  0.024  0.024 
 -1.04  -1.03  -1.02 
Yr 86  0.066  0.019  0.017 
 (2.75)**  -0.84  -0.74 
Yr 87  0.122  0.051  0.061 
 (5.24)**  (2.28)*  (2.68)** 
Yr 88  0.144  0.083  0.04 
 (6.00)**  (3.64)**  -1.73 
Yr 89  0.209  0.098  0.062 
 (9.26)**  (4.56)**  (2.84)** 
Yr 90  0.27  0.098  0.074 
 (13.81)**  (5.26)**  (3.90)** 
Yr 91  0.303  0.113  0.088 
 (15.77)**  (6.11)**  (4.74)** 
Yr 92  0.351  0.136  0.11 
 (18.59)**  (7.55)**  (6.04)** 
Yr 93  0.37  0.148  0.13 
 (20.41)**  (8.54)**  (7.38)** 
Yr 94  0.404  0.181  0.15 
 (21.63)**  (10.14)**  (8.30)** 
Yr 95  0.472  0.176  0.163 
 (34.95)**  (13.61)**  (12.46)** 
Yr 96  0.512  0.196  0.173 
 (37.76)**  (15.06)**  (13.14)** 
Yr 97  0.542  0.212  0.184 
 (34.24)**  (14.01)**  (12.03)** 
Yr 98  0.58  0.239  0.208 
 (44.08)**  (18.98)**  (16.33)** 
Yr 99  0.623  0.246  0.216 
 (40.10)**  (16.50)**  (14.33)** 
Yr 00  0.655  0.268  0.248 
 (42.43)**  (18.15)**  (16.59)** 
Yr 01  0.721  0.34  0.246 
 (58.29)**  (28.71)**  (20.52)** 
Yr 02  0.746  0.358  0.262 
 (69.39)**  (34.77)**  (25.18)** 
Constant 1.52  0.786  0.817 
 (16.18)**  (8.74)**  (8.98)** 
Observations 11,855  11846  11,855 
# of Individuals  2,824  2822  2,824 
R-squared 0.43  0.16  0.1 
Note: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 THE CHILD PENALTY – A COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIAL? | 31 
 
Table A7(c). Effect of motherhood on (dis)amenities – Results of fixed-effect regressions 
concerning flexibility 
  Flexible schedule  Work from home  Distance to job 
Pre1 -0.001  -0.007  -0.075 
 (0.21)  (0.5)  (0.1) 
Post1 0.004  0.009  -1.157 
 (0.53)  (0.6)  (1.54) 
Child penalty  0.005  0.016  -1.082 
  not significant  significant at 14%  significant at 5% 
Mills ratio  -0.037  –  – 
 (2.45)*  –  – 
Partner 0.009  0.008  1.043 
 (2.83)**  (1.22)  (3.15)** 
Years of education  -0.004  -0.006  -0.027 
 (3.92)**  (3.02)**  (0.28) 
Age -0.002  0.007  -0.572 
 (1.09)  (2.67)**  (3.91)** 
Age sq.  0  0  0.011 
 (0.56)  (2.97)**  (5.10)** 
Yr 85  -0.002  0.003  -0.437 
 (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.65) 
Yr 86  -0.002  0.008  -0.641 
 (0.34)  (0.61)  (0.95) 
Yr 87  0.076  0.004  -0.524 
 (12.52)**  (0.32)  (0.8) 
Yr 88  0.057  0.007  -0.459 
 (9.21)**  (0.57)  (0.68) 
Yr 89  0.081  0.008  0.141 
 (13.67)**  (0.66)  (0.22) 
Yr 90  -0.007  0.013  -0.944 
 (1.17)  (1.25)  (1.72) 
Yr 91  -0.007  0.01  -1.179 
 (1.26)  (0.98)  (2.18)* 
Yr 92  -0.003  0.01  -0.815 
 (0.69)  (0.99)  (1.53) 
Yr 93  -0.003  0.011  0.208 
 (0.61)  (1.18)  (0.41) 
Yr 94  -0.002  0.011  -0.142 
 (0.35)  (1.08)  (0.27) 
Yr 95  -0.001  0.019  -0.104 
 (0.4)  (2.61)**  (0.27) 32 | CHRISTINA FELFE 
 
Table A7(c). Continued 
Yr 96  -0.001  0.023  -0.429 
 (0.26)  (3.20)**  (1.12) 
Yr 97  -0.001  0.022  2.93 
 (0.15)  (2.58)**  (6.58)** 
Yr 98  -0.001  0.019  0.024 
 (0.16)  (2.66)**  (0.06) 
Yr 99  -0.003  0.01  3.189 
 (0.63)  (1.23)  (7.29)** 
Yr 00  0  0.009  2.943 
 (0.04)  (1.07)  (6.77)** 
Yr 01  0  0.024  0.293 
 (0.11)  (3.63)**  (0.84) 
Yr 02  0  -0.001  0.134 
 (0.16)  )0.12)  (0.44) 
Constant 0.094  0.036  18.774 
 (2.63)**  (0.72)  (7.10)** 
Observations 11821  11,855  11,855 
# of Individuals  2821  2,824  2,824 
R-squared 0.07  0.01  0.04 
Note: T-statistics are reported in brackets below every coefficient 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
 
Table A8. Hedonic wage regressions including disamenities – Results of fixed-effect model  
  Ln of real wage rate  Ln of real wage rate 
Pre1 0.007  -0.012 
 (0.33)  (0.54) 
Post1 -0.196  -0.185 
 (8.63)**  (7.97)** 
Child penalty  -0.203  -0.173 
  significant significant 
Actual hours worked  –  0.001 
 –  (2.18)* 
Night work  –  -0.03 
 –  -1.62 
Work in the evening  –  -0.002 
 –  -0.19 
Stressful job  –  0.034 
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Table A8. Continued 
Bad conditions  –  0.017 
 –  -1.84 
Distance to workplace –  0.001 
 –  (4.54)** 
Partner 0.018  0.018 
 -1.83  -1.84 
Years of education  0.01  0.011 
 (3.37)**  (3.82)** 
Age 0.138  0.141 
 (31.37)**  (32.28)** 
Age sq.  -0.002  -0.002 
 (30.62)**  (31.31)** 
Constant 0.208  0.012 
 (2.61)**  -0.14 
Observations 11,855  11,855 
# of Individuals  2,824  2814 
R-squared 0.49  0.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSOEP (1984-2003). 
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